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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KIT C. LARSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SYSCO CORPORATION, ROBERT 
JENSON and ROBERT WAGNER, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No 20682 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was summary judgment properly granted against plaintiff on 
his causes of action for breach of contract, defamation and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress as alleged in his 
original complaint? 
II 
Were any issues other than breach of contract, defamation 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress properly before 
the court at the time defendants' motion for summary judgment was 
granted or did the court commit reversible error in denying 
plaintifffs motion to amend his complaint? 
Ill 
If plaintiff's claims for abusive discharge and wrongful 
discharge were properly before the lower court, was there any 
evidence to factually support those claims and to what extent are 
they recognized by Utah law? 
STATEMENT OF TH1 QhBE 
Plaintiff filed five separate claims against defendant 
claiming breach of contract, defamation and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress arising out of the 1984 
termination of his employment. After substantial discovery by 
both sides, defendants moved for summary judgment against 
plaintiff on all five causes of action. The lower court granted 
defendants1 motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's 
complaint with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was a commissioned sales representative for 
defendant Sysco Corporation and was terminated from defendant's 
employment in April of 1984. (R 43). Plaintiff's employment 
with defendant was pursuant to an agreement which had no fixed 
termination date. Under that agreement, plaintiff did not 
promise to work for any specific term and the defendant company 
did not guarantee employment for any specified period. (R 43) 
Plaintiff's termination from defendant's employment took 
place in a polite exit interview which was conducted only between 
himself and his immediate supervisor wherein he was simply told 
that he would have to be let go. (R 43) No further discussion 
took place and no reason was given for the decision. Defendants 
made no statements to any persons regarding the reasons for 
plaintiff's termination. The only indication for plaintifffs 
termination ever given by defendants was a statement contained on 
the "blue slip" submitted by defendants to the Utah Department of 
Employment Security whereon the explanation for termination was 
stated as "poor performance". (R 43) 
Plaintiff's performance as a sales representative for 
defendant dropped drastically during the seven-month period 
immediately preceeding his termination. In addition, for the 
last four months of plaintiff's employment with defendants, he 
was substantially below the budgeted amount of sales which he had 
agreed to. (R 44). To make up for lost income as a result of 
decreasing sales, plaintiff increased the costs of products to 
his customers, thereby increasing the amount of commission he 
earned off of each account. This practice upset defendants' 
customers and resulted in the loss of several of them. (R 44). 
Although plaintiff had experienced problems with drinking 
and had appeared on the job while intoxicated, defendants, 
nevertheless, refrained from so noting on plaintiff's separation 
notice. (R 44). 
Upon the termination of plaintiff from defendant's 
employment in April of 1984, defendant paid to plaintiff all 
commissions due him at that time and, in addition, paid him 
severance pay for a two-week period. In calculating the 
severance pay, defendant remitted to plaintiff approximately 30% 
per week more than plaintiff had earned on a commission basis for 
the a period of time immediately prior to his discharge. (R 
151) . 
At the time of plaintiff's termination and for several years 
prior thereto, the policy of defendant with respect to 
termination of sales representatives was to give them severance 
pay in lieu of written notice of termination. (R 151). This 
policy was necessitated because defendant's sales representatives 
were compensated on a commission basis. Accordingly, the 
performance of such an employee in the face of imminent 
termination typically dropped so drastically that both the 
employee and the company would be adversely affected. It was in 
accordance with this policy of providing pay in lieu of notice 
that plaintiff was given two weeks severance pay. (R 151). 
Plaintiff's original complaint alleged causes of action 
against defendant Sysco Corporation for breach of the employment 
contract between it and plaintiff, (R 3); against defendants 
Robert Jenson and Robert Wagner for inducing defendant Sysco 
Corporation to breach its employment contract with plaintiff, (R 
5); against defendant Sysco Corporation for defamation, (R 6 -
7); against defendant Sysco Corporation for defamation per se (R 
9); and against all defendants for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, (R 9). Although plaintiff did file a "Motion 
to Amend [his] Complaint" (R 103) , he never offered a proposed 
amended complaint and never asserted any additional facts or 
otherwise described the nature and scope of the amendment sought. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The only causes of action before the lower court at the time 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was heard were two common 
law breach of contract claims, two claims for defamation and a 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Plaintiff was an employee hired under a contract of indefinite 
duration, and was, therefore, terminable at will. When an 
individual is hired for an indefinite time, he has no right of 
action against his employer for breach of the employment contract 
upon being discharged. Since no other breaches of contract: were 
alleged or proved by plaintiff, entry of judgment against him was 
appropriate. 
Plaintiff's claims for defamation and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress were not factually supported by the record 
and their dismissal was entirely within the proper exercise of 
the lower court's discretion. 
Although plaintiff did file a motion to amend his complaint, 
no proposed amended complaint was submitted in conjunction with 
that motion. Plaintiff profferred no additional facts which 
would define the precise nature and scope of the amendment he 
sought. Accordingly, plaintiff's Motion to Amend was denied and 
the court's granting of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was properly based only upon the causes of action alleged in the 
original complaint. 
Finally, even if plaintiff had been allowed to amend his 
complaint to include a cause of action for wrongful discharge, 
it was never indicated what type of wrongful discharge theory 
plaintiff desired to assert and no facts which would support any 
such claim were ever offered. Consequently, the lower court's 
granting of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was proper 
and should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED 
BECAUSE AS AN EMPLOYEE EMPLOYED 
UNDER A CONTRACT OF INDEFINITE 
DURATION, PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION BASED UPON HIS TERMINATION. 
The question raised by plaintiff's appeal is whether an 
employee who is hired and works under a contract of indefinite 
duration and is never promised employment for a specified period 
may still recover damages for termination of his employment. In 
his first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that 
"On April 13, 1984, Defendant broke the 
contract and wrongfully discharged the 
Plaintiff and refused to continue the 
Plaintiff in its employ or to pay him any 
part of the compensation hereinbefore set 
out ..." 
Plaintiff's original Complaint paragraph 9; (R 3). 
Plaintiff's second cause of action alleges that the 
individual defendants wrongfully "induced, persuaded and caused 
defendant corporation to violate, repudiate, and break the 
agreement with plaintiff and to refuse to proceed further 
thereunder." (Plaintiff's original Complaint paragraph 16; R 5). 
Thus, it is evident that the first and second causes of action of 
plaintiff's original Complaint raise only claims for common law 
breach of contract. 
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently 
declared that employment contracts of indefinite duration are 
terminable at the will of either party. See, Held v. American 
Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210 (1957); Bullock 
v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 
(1960); Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah 1970); and Mann 
v. American Western Life Insurance Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978). 
Most recently, in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 
19 79), this Court again emphasized this general rule declaring: 
"In the absence of some further express or 
implied stipulation as to the duration of the 
employment or of a good consideration in 
addition to the services contracted to be 
rendered, the contract is no more than an 
indefinite general hiring which is terminable 
at the will of either party. 
When an individual is hired for an indefinite 
time, he has no right of action against his 
employer for breach of the employment 
contract upon being discharged." 
603 P.2d at 792. Plaintiff acknowledges the existence of the "at 
will" employment rule and it is undisputed that plaintiff was 
employed under a contract of indefinite duration. Consequently, 
it is evident that plaintiff's first two causes of action fail to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Plaintiff, however, contends that Idaho rather than Utah law 
should be applied. In support of this contention, plaintiff 
refers to paragraph 8 of the Sales Representative Employment 
Agreement between plaintiff and defendant Sysco. That provision 
provides 
"In the event of any dispute arising under 
this agreement, it is agreed between the 
parties that the law of the State of Idaho 
will govern the interpretation, validity and 
effect of this agreement without regard to 
the place of execution or the place of 
performance thereof." (R 148) 
Thus, the provision relied on by plaintiff pertains only to the 
interpretation and validity of disputes arising under the terms 
of the agreement. However, in this case, there is no issue 
concerning the interpretation of the agreement between the 
parties. 
Rather, as stated by plaintiff in his brief in this appeal 
"the plaintiff!s claims arise not out of the employment but out 
of the termination of that employment." (Appellant's Brief page 
39). Accordingly, the provision providing for Idaho law to be 
used in governing the interpretation of the terms of the contract 
is inapplicable. Thus, Utah law is the appropriate guide for 
decision. 
However, in the event Idaho law were to be applied, it is 
still evident that plaintiff's claims for breach of contract were 
properly dismissed. In Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 
563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977) the court held: 
"The threshold issue presented is whether an 
employee who has not been hired for a 
definite period of time may bring a claim 
against his employer for damages for wrongful 
discharge. An employee who is hired for an 
indeterminate period of time is known as an 
employee at will and it is well established 
that if he is not hired for some definite 
period of time he has no right of action upon 
being discharged." 
553 P.2d at 57. It is, therefore, evident that whether Utah law 
or Idaho law is applied, plaintiff has not stated a cause of 
action for breach of contract arising out of the termination of 
his employment with defendant. 
Although not alleged in his original Complaint and, thus, 
not before the trial court at the time of the granting of 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff, on appeal, 
now contends that the original contract was breached by 
defendants1 alleged failure to give him two weeks notice prior to 
termination. This contention, however, is also without merit. 
It was undisputed at the trial court that the policy of defendant 
Sysco Corporation with respect to the termination of sales 
representatives was to give them severance pay in lieu of written 
notice of termination. That policy was implemented long before 
plaintiff's termination and was in full force and effect at the 
time of his discharge. 
In accordance with that policy, plaintiff was given two 
weeks severance pay at the time of his termination. Perhaps more 
importantly, is the fact that the two weeks severance pay given 
to plaintiff by defendant was far in excess of the average 
commissions which plaintiff was earning at the time of his 
discharge. Accordingly, it is evident that there was no breach 
of the sales representative agreement between plaintiff and 
defendant. 
Moreover, even if there had been a breach of that agreement, 
it is clear that plaintiff suffered no damages as a result 
thereof. It is undisputed that he was fully compensated for the 
entire period of time in which notice of his termination would 
have been given. The compensation which he received was 
approximately 30% per week in excess of that which he had been 
earning at the time of his termination. 
Based upon the foregoing and with the evidence which the 
trial court had before it, it is evident that defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment against plaintiff on his two causes of 
action for breach of contract was properly granted and should be 
upheld. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION BASED 
ON DEFAMATION WERE PROPERLY 
DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY DO NOT STATE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Plaintiff, in his third and fourth causes of action, alleges 
claims against defendants based on defamation. However, the 
allegations of plaintiff's Complaint and the undisputed facts of 
this case clearly establish that these causes of action fail to 
state claims for relief under Utah law. 
It must be observed at the outset, that no defamatory 
statement was ever made by defendants or any of them to any 
persons with respect to plaintiff. Plaintifffs basis for 
contending that he has been defamed stems solely from the fact of 
his termination from defendant's employ. (See Appellant's Brief 
page 27). However, it is undisputed that at the time plaintiff 
was notified of his termination, he was simply told that it would 
be necessary to "let him go". 
Plaintiff was notified of his termination at a polite exit 
interview between himself and his immediate supervisor with no 
other persons being present. No statements were ever made to any 
other persons regarding plaintifffs termination. Thus, the only 
statement upon which plaintiff relies as a foundation for his 
defamation claim is the notation on his "blue slip" that he was 
terminated for "poor performance." Such a notification falls far 
short of the level required to support a claim of defamation. 
This statement does no more than to convey one's subjective 
opinion about an individual. 
Moreover, even if the notation "poor performance" on 
plaintiff's blue slip did rise to the level of outrageousness 
necessary to support a defamation claim, there are additional 
considerations which clearly support the trial court in its 
dismissal of that claim. 
Plaintiff's third cause of action alleges a conventioal 
defamation claim without alleging any special damages. (R 88 
89). As stated by this court is Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318 
(Utah 1979): 
"In order to constitue slander per se, 
without a showing of special harm, it is 
necessary that the defamatory words fall into 
one of four categories: (1) charge of 
criminal conduct, (2) charge of a loathesome 
disease, (3) charge of conduct that is 
incompatible with the exercise of a lawful 
business, trade, profession, or office; and 
(4) charge of the unchastity of a woman. If 
the words spoken do not apply to one of the 
foregoing classifications, special harm must 
be alleged." (emphasis added) 
590 P.2d at 320. Inasmuch as no special damages are alleged and 
count three does not purport to allege defamation per se, it is 
clear that its dismissal was proper. 
Plaintiff contends that his fourth cause of action asserts 
defamation per se and, therefore, does not require an allegation 
of special damages. In addressing the issue of what constitutes 
defamation per se, this Court in Baum v. Gillmanf 667 P.2d 41 
(Utah 1983) stated: 
"When language is used concerning a person or 
his affairs which from its nature necessarily 
mustf or presumably will, as its natural and 
proximate consequence, occasion him pecuniary 
loss, its publication is libelous per se. 
(citations omitted). The nature of the 
writing must be such that the court can 
legally presume that the plaintiff has been 
damaged." (citations omitted). 
667 P.2d at 43. In the instant case, the statement attributed to 
defendants as defamatory falls far short of the test set forth in 
Baum. 
A statement on a blue slip filed with the Utah Employment 
Security Office pursuant to State law which reads merely "poor 
performance" does not rise to the level where "the Court can 
legally presume that the plaintiff has been damaged" as a result. 
(_Id.). The damages alleged by plaintiff (if there are any) arise 
out of his termination from defendant's employment. If they 
have, in fact, occured, they have occured because plaintiff was 
terminated and those damages would exist regardless of the 
statement which appeared on his blue slip as the reason for his 
termination. 
Accordingly, the statement made by defendants on plaintiff's 
blue slip does not amount to defamation per se and special 
damages must be alleged. This, however, plaintiff has failed to 
do and, in fact, cannot do. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint 
for defamation fails to state a cause of action against 
defendants and its dismissal was, therefore, proper. 
Moreover, even if plaintiff had alleged a defamatory 
statement and accompanying special damages, or had alleged a 
statement which was defamatory per se, his claim would still have 
been properly dismissed inasmuch as the statement in this case 
was conditionally priviledged. 
In Combes v. Montegomery Ward & Co. 223 P.2d 272 (Utah 1951) 
this Court was faced with an action for slander arising out of 
the events surrounding the discharge of plaintiff from his job 
with defendant. The trial court had ruled that the statements 
complained of were priviledged communications and therefore 
directed a verdict for the defendants. Plaintiff appealed. This 
court noted that "the existence of a conditional priviledge is a 
question for the court . . . " (JJ3. at 275) , and then discussed 
the elements of a conditional privilege in the following 
language: 
"An occasion is conditionally privileged 
when the circumstances induce a correct or 
reasonable belief that 
"'(a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently 
important interest of the publisher, and 
1,1
 (b) the recipient's knowledge of the 
defamatory matter will be of service in the 
lawful protection of the interest." 
A case quite similar to the instant one 
involving employer and employee is 
Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172, 43 S.E. 
594, 596, wherein the court, referring to a 
situation of conditional privilege factually 
like ours, said as follows: "* * * any 
communication between employer and employee 
is protected by this privilege, provided it 
is made bona fide about something in which 
(1) the speaker or writer has an interest or 
duty; (2) the hearer or person addressed has 
a corresponding interest or duty; and 
provided (3) the statement is made in 
protection of that interest or in the 
performance of that duty. There must also be 
an honest belief in the truth of the 
statement. When these facts are found to 
exist, the communication is protected by the 
law, unless the plaintiff can show malice on 
the defendant's part; the burden in this 
respect being upon the plaintiff." 
228 P.2d at 275. 
The statement upon which plaintiff relies in support of his 
defamation claims is the indication of "poor performance" on his 
"blue slip". When the elements of the conditional privilege 
referred to in Coombes are applied to this statement, it is clear 
that it is, in fact, privileged. As plaintiff's employers, 
defendants had a duty established by law to prepare and submit a 
"blue slip" to the Department of Employment Security. Thus, the 
first element is met. 
It is equally evident that the Department of Employment 
Security, who is the "hearer" in this case has a corresponding 
duty to receive and process "blue slips". Accordingly, the 
second element is also established. 
In preparing a "blue slip" the employer is required to give 
an explanation for the termination of its employee. That 
explanation is required so that the Department of Employment 
Security may make a determination as to the eligibility of the 
ex-employee for unemployment compensation benefits. Hence, it is 
evident that the statement on plaintiff's "blue slip" was made in 
the performance of the duty imposed upon defendants to submit 
"blue slips" to the Department of Employment Security. 
Consequently, the third and final element necessary to establish 
a conditional privilege is also met. 
As noted by this Court in Coombes "when these facts are 
found to exist, the communication is protected by the law, unless 
the plaintiff can show malice on the defendant's part" 228 P.2d 
at 275. The facts of this case clearly do not support a finding 
of malice. Thus, plaintiff's claim fails to state a cause of 
action under Utah law. 
Moreover, even if the statement were defamatory per se, and 
was not privileged, it is well established that: 
"The truth of a defamatory statement of fact 
is a complete defense to an action for 
defamation." 
Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL Inc. 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1976). It is 
undisputed that plaintiff's performance as a sales representative 
for defendant Sysco Corporation dropped drastically during the 
period immediately preceeding his termination. The total dollar 
sales per month made by plaintiff dropped approximately 
$57,000.00 per month between September of 1983 and February of 
1984, (R 38). During the last four months of plaintiff's 
employment he was below the budgeted amount of sales for every 
month. In addition, plaintiff had appeared on the job while 
intoxicated and had increased prices to defendant's customers 
without authorization, resulting in loss of business to 
defendant. Such performance on the part plaintiff is not only 
poor but was and is competely unacceptable to defendant Sysco 
Corporation. 
As a result, it is evident that defendants had an honest 
belief that the statement was true because it accurately 
described the circumstances of plaintiff's performance at the 
time of his discharge. Accordingly, it is clear that the lower 
court had sufficient evidence before it to justify dismissal of 
plaintifffs claims for defamation and that the order should be 
upheld, 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM AND WAS 
PROPERLY DISMISSED. 
Plaintiff also asserts a tort claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. (R 9). In support of the 
validity of that claim, plaintiff contends that "the courts of 
other juridictions have recognized that a cause of action for the 
infliction of emotional distress may be stated by the employee in 
a wrongful discharge case." (Appellant's Brief page 36). 
However, the cases cited by plaintiff in suport of that 
contention are plainly inapposite. Those cases deal with the 
scope of damges available to an aggreived employee who has 
successfully asserted a tort claim for abusive or wrongful 
discharge. The awarding of damges for emotional distress in 
those cases was nothing more than a determination by the court 
that the scope of damages under such a cause of action would 
include compensation for emotional distress. The cases did not 
hold that the circumstances therein supported a cause of action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
In Rieser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), this Court 
discussed the conditions under which emotional distress is 
actionable, declaring: 
"Our study of the authorities, and of the 
arguments advanced convinces us that 
the best considered view recognizes an action 
for severe emotional distress, though not 
accompanied by bodily impact or physical 
injury, where the defendant intentionally 
engaged in some conduct toward plaintiff. . . 
and his actions are of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in that 
they offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality. 
641 P.2d at 100, quoting Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 
P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961). Rieser relied on Section 46 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts to define the elements of a cause 
of action for emotional distress. Section 46 provides: 
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress, and if 
bodily harm to the other results from it, for 
such bodily harm. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). The two key phrases in that definition 
are the subject of further explanation in the Comments to Section 
46. Comment (d) describes the kind of outrageous conduct which 
will give rise to liability: 
The cases thus far decided have found 
liability only where the defendantfconduct 
has been extreme and outrageous. It has not 
been enough that the defendant has acted with 
an intent which is tortious or even criminal, 
or that he has intended to inflict emotional 
distress, or even that his conduct has been 
characterized by "malice," or a degree of 
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff 
to punitive damages for another tort. 
Liability has been found only where the con-
duct has been so outrageous in character, and 
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency and to be regarded 
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). Comment (j) to Secion 46 describes the 
"severe emotional distress" which is required in this tort: 
[C]omplete emotional tranquility is seldom 
attainable in this world, and some degree of 
transient and trivial emotional distress is a 
part of the price of living among people. 
The law intervenes only where the distress 
inflicted is so sever that no reasonable man 
could be expected to endure it. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). It is undisputed that the basis of 
plaintifffs claim for emotional distress is the fact of his 
termination. A study of the authorities reveals, however, that 
mere termination from employment is not a sufficient basis for a 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
In Viestenz v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 681 F.2d 699 (10th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982), for example, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal of a terminated 
employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
even though plaintiff alleged that he had been threatened, was 
allegedly told that he could be blackballed by the union, and 
that he could lose his job unless he admitted stealing from his 
employer. Id., at 701. While that case involved issues of labor 
law preemption, the legal standard the court: used in ruling 
against the plaintiff is virtually identical to that articulated 
in Rieser, and the Restatement. Compare Vientenz at 701-03 with 
Restatement, comments (d) and (j), supra. 
In Brenimer v Great Western Sugar Co., 567 F. Supp. 218 (D. 
Colo. 1983), Judge Kerr also held that termination from 
employment is not sufficient to state a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. In Brenimer, plaintiff brought 
an action for wrongful termination of employment under the Age 
discrimination in Employment Act and asserted a pendent cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Plaintiff claimed to have suffered humiliation, stress, 
depression, and frustration as a result of his termination* The 
court noted that, even assuming the truth of the emotional 
distress, it would dismiss plaintiff's claim, declaring: 
"While it is possible for a single, isolated 
activity to be a sufficient basis for a cause 
of action, it will only be so where . . . a 
private individual has blatantly and severely 
harrassed another. 
567 F. Supp. at 223, quoting Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 530 
F. Supp. 776, 780 (D. Colo. 1982). Judge Kerr noted that 
plaintiff had been fired only once, and that plaintiff had not 
established a pattern of outrageous conduct sufficient to support 
a cause of action. 
Finally, dismissal of plaintiff's claim for infliction of 
emotional distress sould also be upheld because the court lacked 
jurisdiction over that claim. Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-1 - 35-1-106, provides the exclusive 
remedy for employment-related injuries. In particular, Section 
35-1-60 provides that "no action at law may be maintained against 
an employer" for injuries sustained by an employee "in the course 
of or because of or arising out of his employment ...". This 
Court has held that the Act's displacement or preemption of 
common law tort actions against employers applies to intentional 
torts as well as to claims of negligence. See Bryan v. Utah 
International, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). 
Other state courts have held specifically that common law 
tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are 
foreclosed by the exclusivity provisions of the state's workmen's 
compensation law. See, e.g., Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300 
(Colo. 1982); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 413 N.E. 2d 711 (Mass. 
1980); Battista v. Chrysler Corporation, 454 A.2d 286 (Del. 
Super. 1982); Belanoff v. Grayson, 471 N.Y.S. 2d 91 (N.Y.App.Div. 
1984). Accordingly, plaintiff's tort claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is barred by the exclusivity 
provisions of Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act. 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's fifth cause of action 
for infliction of emotional distress fails to state a cause of 
action under Utah law and its dismissal was proper and should be 
upheld. 
POINT IV 
DENIEAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
LEASE TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT WAS 
PROPER. 
As a preliminary matter, it must be pointed out that no 
proposed amended complaint was submitted in conjunction with 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend and no additional facts were 
proffered. Accordingly, the precise nature and extent of the 
amendment which plaintiff sought was not capable of 
ascertainment. Although plaintiff argued what he call a 
"wrongful discharge" theory in opposition to defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, he never clearly identified whether he 
based that theory on violation of public policy or breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or some other 
theory. Moreover, plaintiff never identified any public policy 
to have been violated and he never alleged any bad faith on the 
part of defendants in terminating his employment. 
Consequently, the effect of plaintiff's motion was to ask 
the lower court to give him free license to file an amended 
complaint containing any allegations he may chose. Such 
unmitigated license would be clearly prejudicial to defendants 
since it would allow plaintiff, after the hearing on defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment, to submit an amended complaint 
raising new issues of law which were beyond the scope of the 
summary judgment thereby resurrecting his case, and necessitation 
the preparation, refiling and rehearing of defendants1 motion for 
summary judgment. 
Thus, plaintifffs request for leave to amend his complaint 
amounted to little more than an attempt to buttress his position 
against summary judgment. In general, courts are less willing to 
grant leave to amend a complaint after the opposing party has 
moved for summary judgment, particularly where the plaintiff's 
situation has not changed since the filing of the original 
complaint or where the amendment represents an effort to avoid an 
adverse summary judgment. Layfield v. Bill Heard Chevrolet Co., 
607 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1979); Local 492, Etc. v. Georgia 
Power Co., 684 F.2d 721, 724 (11th Cir. 1982). 
Moreover, where a plaintiff does not state the nature of the 
proposed amendment or the reason for his request for leave to 
amend, leave to amend should not be granted. Jordan v. County 
of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311, 1324 (9th Cir. 1982). 
In the instant case, not only did plaintiff interpose his 
Motion to Amend in order to buttress his position against summary 
judgment, but he also completely failed to indicate the nautre 
and scope of his proposed amendment. Accordingly, it is evident 
that hs motion was properly denied. 
In addition, it is well settled that leave to file an 
amended complaint must be denied where allowance of the amended 
complaint would prove a fruitless act or where the claim asserted 
lacks merit. Foman v. Davis 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Hall v. 
Pennsylvania State Police, 433 F. Supp. 385, 388 (E.D. Penn. 
1976) . 
In his Motion to Amend, plaintiff stated: 
"The purpose [sic] the plaintiff seeks to 
amend the complaint is to amplify the 
allegations set. forth in the first and second 
causes of action, more specifically to 
include language indicating that there is an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing between employer and employee." (R 
103) 
This position is reiterated by plaintiff in his "Memorandum of 
Facts and Law" which he submitted in support of his Motion to 
Amend wherein he stated: 
"The plaintiff desires to amplify the 
allegations set forth in his first two causes 
of action by asserting that there is an 
inplied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing between an employer and employee." (r 
106-107). 
If plaintiff had been allowed to amend his complaint to include 
an allegation that there existed an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, it would still add nothing to his 
complaint beyond what was originally contained in it. Plaintiff 
never alleged that any such covenant was not complied with and he 
did not indicate in his Motion to Amend that he desired to 
include an allegation that the covenant was violated. 
Accordingly, if the amendment which he requested in his 
motion had been granted, it would have proved fruitless and was 
therefore properly denied. Moreover, even had the breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing also been 
alleged, facts supporting had been given and it were properly 
before the lower court, it is clear, as indicated in Point V 
below that there in no foundation, either in law or in fact, on 
which such a claim can be supported. Accordingly, plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend was properly denied. 
POINT V 
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION HAD BEEN 
BEFORE THE LOWER COURT, THE 
GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WOULD STILL HAVE 
BEEN PROPER. 
As pointed out in Points I through IV above, no cause of 
action for wrongufl discharge was even before the lower court at 
the time it granted defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Although plaintiff did file a document entitled "Motion to Amend 
Complaint", no such amendment was authorized by the lower court 
and, in fact, no proposed amended complaint raising any 
additional issues was ever proffered by plaintiff. That the 
lower court was correct in denying plaintifffs Motion to Amend is 
more fully addressed in Point IV above. 
Although plaintiff argued various wrongful discharge 
theories in his Amended Memorandum in Objection to Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R 174 - 210) defendants specifically objected 
to the presentation of those issues. As stated in defendants1 
Reply Memorandum: 
"Accordingly, the issues relating to wrongful 
discharge which are raised by plaintiff in 
his Memorandum in Objection to Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment are not properly 
before the Court at this point, and cannot 
preclude the granting of defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Nevertheless, in order 
to allow the Court to completely and finally 
dispose of plaintifffs claims and without in 
any way acquiescing in or accepting 
plaintiff's additional causes of action as 
being before the Court, the following 
discussions of the issues argued by plaintiff 
is presented." (R 162) 
Notwithstanding his failure to present the issue to the 
lower court, plaintiff on appeal now argues what he calls a 
wrongful discharge theory which is actually three separate causes 
of action. In Appellant's Brief it is first contended that a 
cause of action exists in tort when an employee is terminated in 
violation of a recognized public policy. Second, it is claimed 
that when an employee gives independent consideration in addition 
to the services contracted for, the employment at will doctrine 
may be modified. Finally, it is alleged that when an employee is 
terminated in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, he may assert a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge. 
With respect to the public policy and additional 
consideration theories asserted by plaintiff on appeal, it is 
clear such claims were never before the lower and were not part 
of plaintiff's Motion to Amend. Consequently, it is evident that 
those theories cannot justify a reversal of the lower courtfs 
decision. 
The question raised by this portion of plaintifffs appeal is 
whether an employee who is hired and works under a contract of 
indefinite duration and is never promised employment for a 
specified period and who alleges only breach of contract, 
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress may 
still recover damages for wrongful termination. 
As stated in Point I above, this Court has consistently held 
that contracts of indefinite duration are terminable at the will 
of either party and that no right of action against an employer 
for breach of the employment contract can be maintained upon 
being discharged. This line of cases and, in particular, this 
Court's unequivocal reliance upon the "at will" rule have led 
federal judges interpreting Utah law recently, to dismiss claims 
for wrongful termination brought by persons formerly employed 
under contracts of indefinite duration. See, e.g., Heward v. 
Western Electric Co.r 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3423, 3425 (10th Cir. 
1984); Amos v. Corp. or Presiding Bishop, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
2744, 2769-70 (D.Utah 1984). 
In Amos, Judge Winder rejected the contention that the Utah 
Supreme Court had never actually decided whether a cause of 
action for wrongful termination exists in Utah, observing: 
Although this Court has the duty and power to 
mold the laws of this state when applying 
uncertain state law, it may not change 
existing state law. The plaintiffs argue 
that none of the Utah cases that defendants 
cite is dispositive because in none of the 
cases was the Utah Supreme Court asked to 
recognize a wrongful discharge cause of 
action. However, the long history of the 
Utah Supreme Court's recognition of the 
terminable-at-will doctrine, the language the 
Court has used in dismissing those cases and 
the failure of the Court to even suggest that 
it might recognize an exception to that rule 
lead this Court to the conclusion that the 
recognition of an exception to the 
terminable-at-will doctrine would be a change 
in Utah law. 
Id, (footnote and citation omitted). It is undisputed that 
plaintiff was employed under a contract of indefinite duration. 
Nevertheless, he asserts a wrongful termination cause of action 
which is based on three separate theories. 
A. Additional Consideration. 
Point III of Appellant's Brief contends that: "an exception 
to the at-will doctrine is created where the employee gives 
consideration independent of his labors for wage." (Appellant's 
Brief page 17). This contention, however, fails both legally and 
factually. 
Plaintiff's position is not legally sound because he has not 
identified the nature and scope of the modification of the "at 
will" employment doctrine which would be created if plaintiff had 
provided additional consideration. In order to do so, plaintiff 
would have to identify the precise nature of the additional 
consideration he contends was offered and describe specifically 
the effect the giving of such additional consideration would have 
upon his employment relationship. Plaintiff's failure to do so 
not only renders his claim legally unsupportable but factually as 
well. 
Plaintiff's position is also factually unsupportable in that 
there is no allegation in any of the pleadings before the Court 
that plaintiff did, in fact, provide any additional consideration 
to defendant Sysco. In fact, the only reference made to giving 
additional consideration appears on page 7 of Plaintifffs 
Memorandum in Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment. (R 117). 
That reference simply cites to paragraph 2 of the Sales 
Representative's Employment Agreement. (R 146). Paragraph 2 of 
that agreement enumerates certain covenants made to Sysco 
Corporation by all sales representatives. 
Those covenants can basically be divided into three 
categories. First, the sales representative agrees to devote his 
best efforts to advance the interests of the company and to 
refrain from engaging in any solicitation of orders for any 
product or service other than that of the company. Second, the 
sales representative agrees that for a period of one year 
following the termination of his relationship with the company, 
he will not directly compete with the company or its business. 
Finally, the employee agrees to maintain the confidentiality of 
the company's trade secrets. 
All of these covenants, on the part of the sales 
representative, are part of the original consideration given to 
defendant for its agreement to employ plaintiff. Nothing 
contained in those covenants even approaches the giving of 
additional consideration which could support plaintiff's 
contention, even if it were recognized by Utah law. 
The only other potential additonal consideration identified 
by plaintiff is at page 18 of his brief where he contends he 
rendered extensive efforts on the "touch tone system" 
(Appellant's Brief page 18). That system, however, was never 
adopted by defendant, and plaintiff was instructed on numerous 
occasionsto discontinue any use of company time to promote the 
system. (Deposition of Robert Jenson, page 61). 
Accordingly, it is evident that the position taken by 
plaintiff with respect to the giving of additional consideration 
is unsupported by the facts and inadequate under the current 
status of law. Consequently, even if the allegations raised by 
plaintiff had been properly before the lower court and were 
factually supportable, they would still not preclude the granting 
of defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. Public Policy. 
Again, plaintiff, without any basis in the pleadings, 
asserts that his termination is actionable because various courts 
across the country have recognized a public policy limitation to 
the employment at will doctrine. He contends that those 
decisions entitle him to proceed under such a theory whether or 
not he can factually support it or has even alleged it. Thus, 
plaintiff asks this Court to create new law in the state of Utah 
and then to fashion a remedy for violations thereof without any 
factual basis for doing so. 
Making new law, however, and the recognition of public 
policy to promote or protect it are matters best accomplished by 
the legislature. In particular, the legislature is surely the 
appropriate forum to consider and accomodate the competing 
interests that would be affected by a change in the at-will 
employment doctrine. The New York Court of Appeals had recent 
occasion to discuss this issue in Murphy v. American Home 
Products Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293, 461 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (1983). 
In Murphy, the plaintiff alleged that he had been terminated 
because of his "disclosure to top management of alleged 
accounting improprieties on the part of corporate personnel..." 
461 N.Y.S. 2d at 233. Based upon this allegation, the plaintiff 
asserted causes of action for wrongful termination of employment. 
In affirming dismissal of those claims, the New York Court 
emphasized that it could recognize the plaintiff's cause of 
action only by altering the traditional at-will doctrine. Ld. at 
235. The Court declined to do so without an express mandate from 
the legislature, explaining that both the question of liability 
itself and "the definition of its configuration if it is to be 
recognized" are appropriate for legislative inquiry. _Id. The 
Court also eloquently explained the reasons why it should decline 
to create a new cause of action for wrongful termination in the 
absence of a legislative mandate: 
The Legislature has infinitely greater 
resources and procedural means to discern the 
public will, to examine the variety of 
pertinent considerations, to elicit the views 
of the various segments of the community that 
would be directly affected and in any event 
critically interested, and to investigate and 
anticipate the impact of imposition of such 
liability. Standards should doubtless be 
established applicable to the multifarious 
types of employment and various circumstances 
of discharge. If the rule of nonliability 
for termination of at-will employment is to 
be tempered, it should be accomplished 
through a principled statutory scheme, 
adopted after opportunity for public 
ventilation, rather than in consequence of 
judicial resolution of the partisan arguments 
of individual adversarial litigants. 
Additionally, if the rights and obligations 
under a relationship forged, perhaps some 
time ago, between employer and employee in 
reliance on existing legal principles are to 
be significatnly altered, a fitting 
accommodation of the competing interests to 
be affected may well dictate that any change 
should be given prospective effect only; or 
at least so the legislature might conclude. 
Id. at 235-236. Cf. S.D.C.L. Paragraphs 60-1-3 and 60-1-4 (1977) 
(South Dakota statute establishing presumptions as to term of 
employment contracts). 
These considerations sould be given controlling weight here. 
The Utah Legislature has already expressly prohibited the denial 
of employment opportunities for a number of reasons. See Utah 
Code Ann. Section 34-35-1 et seq. (Anti-Descrimination Actf 
forbidding employment decisions made on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, ancestry, age, national origin, or handicap.) 
See also Utah Code Ann. Section 34-37-16 (forbidding employers to 
deny or terminate employment because of refusal to submit to 
polygraph examination); Utah Code Ann. Section 34-20-8 (f) 
(prohibiting termination for filing charges or giving testimony 
in unfair labor practice proceeding). 
All of these limitations on the employer's right to 
discharge employees were adopted in light of the existence of the 
employment at will doctrine. Current Utah law thus reflects the 
fact that the Legislature has already seen fit to limit an 
employer's right to terminate employees for certain limited 
reasons and no others. In view of the Legislature's ability and 
inclination to limit the employment at will doctrine in specific 
instances, this Court should decline to adopt the extremely broad 
exception to the at will employment rule which plaintiff urges. 
Moreover, even if Utah law were broadly enough construed to 
recognize the exception which plaintiff argues, there is still no 
basis for denying defendants1 motion. Plaintiff has neither 
alleged nor identified any public policy which he contends has 
been violated in the instant case. Thus, it is again evident 
that plaintiff's position is unsupported by the facts and not 
founded in the law. Accordingly, defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment was properly granted. 
C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
m i i • • • — — i i 
Plaintiff also argues m his brief that his termination 
violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
inherent in his employment contract. This contention, however, 
also fails both legally and factually. 
Plaintiff's position is legally unsupportable inasmuch as he 
has cited no Utah case for the proposition that persons employed 
under contracts of indefinite duration may still recover damages 
by alleging that their employment contracts contained such an 
implied covenant. 
In this connection, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has recently 
declared, in upholding summary dismissal of a former employee's 
claim that her termination was in bad faith, that such a broad 
exception to the at-will rule is unnecessary: 
fl[T]o imply into each employment contract a 
duty to terminate in good faith would seem to 
subject each termination to judicial 
incursions into the amorphous concept of bad 
faith. We are not persuaded that protection 
of employees requires such an intrusion on 
the employment relationship or such an 
imposition on the courts. 
Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 629 (Haw.1982). 
A number of recent decisions have also correctly pointed out that 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not 
create an independent cause of action for employees terminated 
at-will. Rather, it is a derivative principle which comes into 
play only in "defining and modifying duties which grow out of 
specific contract terms and obligations." Gordon v. Mathew Bender 
& Co., Inc., 562 F.Supp. 1286, 1289 (N.D. 111. 1983) (rejecting 
at-will employees1 wrongful termination claim based upon imlied 
covenant); Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., supra, 58 
N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S. 2d 232, 237 (1983) (implied covenant "is 
in aid and furtherance of other terms of the agreement of the 
parties"; claim by at-will employee based upon implied covenant 
dismissed). 
Plaintifffs claim is also factually unsupportable unasmuch 
as he made no allegation and offered no facts tending to support 
or show that his termination was in bad faith or that it breached 
the implied covenant he alleges. In his motion to amend his 
complaint, plaintiff sought only to add an allegation to the 
effect that there was inherent or implied in the employment 
relationship a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. He did 
not, however, at any point, allege or seek to allege that that 
covenant was violated or breached by his discharge. 
The 
undisputed evidence before the Court established that defendants 
terminated plaintiff because they felt that his performance had 
declined substantially. (See Point II above). Rather than to 
offer evidence rebutting that position, plaintiff merely seeks to 
explain it by contending that his decline in performance was due 
to seasonal fluctuations. However, any such fluctuations would 
be taken into account in establishing the projected budget for 
plaintiff's performance and it is undisputed that plaintiff's 
performance was substantially below his budgeted amount for the 
four-month period immediately preceeding his termination, 
Consequently, there was ample undisputed evidence to support 
defendants1 position that they acted in good faith in making a 
legitimate business decision to protect their best interests as a 
going business concern. 
Accordingly, it is clear that plaintiff's cause(s) of action 
for wrongful discharge were never properly before the lower 
court. Even had they been so, it is equally evident that they 
are both actually and legally unsupportable and that the granting 
of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment under the facts of 
this case was entirely appropriate and should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion and the 
undisputed facts which were before the trial court that each of 
plaintiff's claims based upon termination of his employment were 
properly dismissed and that the lower court's ruling should be 
affirmed. 
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